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Since ancient times, couples have been trying to influence the sex of their
children. Following a suggestion by Aristotle, they were making love in the
north wind to ensure the birth of a son and in the south wind to ensure the
birth of a daughter. According to a proposal made by Galen, men were tying a
string around their left testicle to make a boy and tying the right one to make
a girl. In medieval times the proposed formula got even more bizarre when
alchemists recommended to drink the blood of a lion and then have
intercourse under a full moon to sire a son.1
Choosing the sex of our children is no longer a fantasy. However, the
prospect of a reliable method for sex selection has not only raised old hopes,
but also new fears. Many people are concerned that it may lead to an imbalance
of the sexes, most likely a preponderance of males. Such an overabundance of
men and a shortage of women, some sociologists have predicted, will invariably
cause an enormous rise in enforced celibacy, polyandry, homosexuality,
prostitution, rape and other sexual crimes.2 Many feminists are similarly
alarmed. Some have called the deliberate choice of a male child ‘the original
sexist sin’.3 Others went so far as to warn us of an impending ‘gynocide’.4 Are
these fears justified? How well are they supported by empirical evidence? And
most of all: does sex selection call for a legal ban?
Before turning to these questions, let us briefly review the state of the art.
Currently, there are three different types of sex selection: sex-selective abortion,
sex-selective embryo transfer and sex-selective insemination. Sex-selective
abortion has been made possible by prenatal diagnosis. Amniocentesis,
chorionic villus sampling and ultrasound not only allow for the detection of
fetal abnormalities, but also for the determination of fetal sex. In principle,
women may use the information to decide whether or not to terminate a
pregnancy if the fetus is not of the desired sex. Using prenatal diagnosis for the
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sole purpose of sex-selective abortions is, however, very rare in Western
societies. For example, a follow-up study of 578 patients having prenatal
diagnosis at one Melbourne centre found that none of the women had a
termination for fetal sex.5 Going through the traumatizing experience of an
abortion is usually seen as too high a price for a child of a particular sex.
Sex-selective embryo transfer has been facilitated by the arrival of
pre-implantation genetic diagnosis,6 which is an alternative to prenatal
diagnosis. It offers couples who are at risk of transmitting a genetic defect
and are having in-vitro fertilization, the opportunity to have their embryos
screened before they are transferred into the uterus. Since only those
embryos that are free of the abnormality concerned will qualify for transfer
to the womb, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis reduces the risk of bearing
a child with a genetic disease and helps to avoid the difficult decision
whether or not to terminate a pregnancy. Like prenatal diagnosis, pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis can also be used to determine the sex of the
embryos. Thus, women may request to transfer only those embryos that are
of the desired sex.
Sex-selective insemination has become possible with the recent development
of a sperm separation technology called MicroSort, which relies on an
identifiable difference between X and Y chromosome-bearing spermatozoa.
X- and Y-bearing sperm cells differ in their total DNA content by 2.8%, owing
to the larger size of the X chromosome. A flow cytometric separation yields an
average of 92% X-bearing and 73% Y-bearing sperm populations.7 The
separated sperm populations can then be used for intrauterine insemination.
Given that not every attempt of artificial insemination results in a pregnancy,
couples will have to undergo an average of three to five cycles of insemination.
Each attempt will cost about £1250.
It can seem, therefore, that there is not yet any convenient method of sex
selection. Sex-selective abortion requires the termination of a pregnancy;
sex-selective embryo transfer necessitates in-vitro fertilization; and sex-
selective insemination is still ineffective. However, since it is likely that
MicroSort will soon be refined, sex-selective insemination is certainly the
technology of the future. As soon as this sperm separation technology
develops into a safe and reliable procedure, sex selection may become
attractive to many couples. The only thing that would be needed to have a
child of the preferred sex would be a visit to a fertility clinic and several
cycles of intrauterine insemination.
Scientific interest in the development of a sperm separation technique has
mainly arisen from the desire to prevent X-linked disorders. There are more
than 500 sex-linked diseases in humans, including haemophilia, Duchenne’s
muscular dystrophy, Lesch-Nyhan syndrome and Tay-Sachs disease.8 In most
cases, the X-linked disorders are only expressed in the male offspring of carrier
mothers. Thus, women who are carriers of a severe sex-linked disease often
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choose to have no children or to terminate their pregnancy if prenatal testing
reveals the fetus to be a boy. A reliable sperm separation technology such as
MicroSort would allow for the exclusive conception of unaffected girls.
Sex selection for the prevention of X-linked disorders is generally regarded
as morally acceptable. The public debate, therefore, focuses almost entirely on
sex selection for non-medical reasons. Many European countries, including
Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Italy and Germany, have passed legislation that
makes sex selection for any but the most serious of medical reasons a crime.
For instance, Germany’s notorious Embryo Protection Act 1990 considers
social sex selection a criminal offence punishable by one year of imprison-
ment. In the Australian state of Victoria, the sentence is even harsher. Under
section 50 of the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic) doctors performing sex
selection for non-medical reasons face up to two years of imprisonment in
addition to ‘240 penalty units’, which is equivalent to a fine of $A24 000.
More recently, Canada enacted the Assisted Human Reproduction Act 2004
declaring that doctors performing sex selection for non-medical reasons are
guilty of ‘an offence and liable, on conviction on indictment, to a fine not
exceeding $CAN500 000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten
years, or to both.’
Is there any valid justification for criminalizing social sex selection and for
sentencing a doctor to jail for, say, helping the parents of three boys to finally
conceive a girl? I don’t think so – at least not in a Western liberal democracy.
Western societies are pluralistic societies. They consist of individuals with
different concepts of the meaning of life, of the existence of God and of the
ways to pursue happiness. Consequently, in modern societies there will always
be irresolvable differences over what is the good for human beings. If a
government tries to impose a particular morality upon its citizens, social
conflict is inevitable. To avoid social tension and to deal with the moral
pluralism of its citizens, Western societies ought to be based upon a
‘presumption in favour of liberty’: each citizen should have the right to live
his or her life as he or she chooses so long as they do not infringe upon the
rights of others. The state may interfere with the free choices of its citizens
only to prevent harm to others.
This so-called ‘harm principle’, which has been developed by Wilhelm von
Humboldt and John Stuart Mill, has three important implications. Firstly, the
burden of proof is always on those who opt for a legal prohibition of a
particular action. It is they who must show that the action in question is going
to harm others. Secondly, the evidence for the harms to occur has to be clear
and persuasive. It must not be based upon highly speculative sociological or
psychological assumptions. And thirdly, the mere fact that an action may be
seen by some as contrary to their moral or religious beliefs does not justify a
legal prohibition. The domain of the law is not the enforcement of morality,
but the prevention of harm to others.9
From sorting sperm to the sorting society? 23
With this in mind, we shall turn to some of the most common objections
to social sex selection and inquire whether they provide a rational basis for
outlawing it.
A constantly recurring objection to sex selection is that choosing the sex of
our children is to ‘play God’. This religious objection has been made to all
kinds of medical innovations. For example, using chloroform to relieve the
pain of childbirth was once considered contrary to the will of God as it
avoided the ‘primeval curse on woman’. Similarly, the use of inoculations was
opposed with sermons preaching that diseases are ‘sent by Providence’ for the
punishment of sin and it is wrong of man to escape from such divine
retribution. Since even fundamentalist Christians ceased to regard the
alleviation of pain and the curing of diseases as morally impermissible, it is
hard to take this objection seriously. What was once seen as ‘playing God’ is
now seen as acceptable medical practice. More importantly, the objection that
sex selection is a violation of ‘God’s Law’ is an explicit religious claim. As
Western liberal democracies are based on a strict separation of state and
church, no government is entitled to pass a law to enforce compliance with a
specific religion. People who consider the option of sex selection as contrary
to their religious belief are free to refrain from it, but they are not permitted
to use the coercive power of the law to impose their theology upon all those
who do not share their religious world view.10
Some are opposed to sex selection because they have the feeling it is
somehow ‘unnatural’. Like the objection that choosing the sex of our children
is playing God, the claim that sex selection is not natural most often expresses
an intuitive reaction rather than a clearly reasoned moral response. That a
particular human action is unnatural in no way implies that it is morally
wrong. To transplant a heart to save a human life is certainly unnatural, but is
it for that reason immoral? Surely not! Thus, if we have to decide whether an
action is morally right or wrong we cannot settle the issue by asking whether
it is natural or unnatural.11
A more serious objection to sex selection is based on the claim that medical
procedures ought to be employed for medical purposes only. Flow cytometric
sperm separation, it is argued, is a medical technology designed to enable
couples who are at risk of transmitting a severe sex-linked genetic disorder to
have a healthy child. In the absence of a known risk to transmit a serious
X-linked disease, there is simply no valid justification for employing flow
cytometric sperm separation. This is a familiar objection in debates over novel
applications of genetic and reproductive technologies. However, familiar as it
may be, it is certainly not a persuasive one.We have already become accustomed
to a healthcare system in which physicians provide services that have no direct
medical benefit but that do have great personal value for the individuals seeking
it. Given the acceptance of breast enlargements, hair replacements, ultrasound-
assisted liposuctions and other forms of cosmetic surgery, one cannot, without
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calling that system into question, condemn a practice merely because it uses a
medical procedure for lifestyle or child-rearing choices.12
A related objection is that offering a service for social sex selection
constitutes an inappropriate use of limited medical resources. Again, if
offering face-lifts is not considered to be a misallocation of scarce medical
resources, it is hard to see how offering sex selection can be considered a
misallocation of scarce medical resources. Moreover, by implying that every
time a patient gets a nose-job another patient misses out on a bypass, this
objection betrays a severely distorted conception of economics. If at all, this
argument may apply to a state-run socialist economy based on a five-year
plan, but certainly not to a private-run capitalist economy based on a free
market. A chef opening a restaurant offering French cuisine does not deprive
us of our daily bread. Similarly, a doctor opening up a fertility centre offering
sex selection does not deprive us of basic health care. Provided their
businesses are set up privately and their services are paid for privately, they
don’t deprive anyone of services.
Perhaps the most powerful objection to sex selection is that it may distort
the natural sex ratio and lead to a socially disruptive imbalance of the sexes, as
has occurred in countries such as India and China.13 However, it is an
empirical question whether a distortion of the natural sex ratio poses a real
threat to Western societies. It cannot be answered by intuition, but only by
scientific evidence. For a severe sex ratio distortion to occur, at least two
conditions must be met. Firstly, there must be a significant preference for
children of a particular sex, and secondly there must be a considerable
demand for a reproductive service for social sex selection. It is important to
note that both conditions need to be met simultaneously. For example, if
there was a marked preference for children of a particular sex, but couples
were unwilling to use sex selection technology (because it was thought to be
too intrusive, too expensive, immoral or simply against their religion), then a
readily available service for sex selection would not have any demographic
effect. Likewise, if there was considerable interest in employing sex selection
technology, but couples did not have a marked preference for children of a
particular sex (because they wish to have an equal number of boys and girls),
then, again, a readily available service for preconception sex selection would
not alter the sex ratio in any way.14
In order to ascertain whether the two preconditions for a sex ratio
distortion are indeed met, we have conducted representative social surveys in
Germany, the UK and the USA. In all three surveys, a randomized, computer-
assisted telephone interview tool was utilized to ask more than 1000 men and
women between the age of 18 and 45 about their gender preferences and their
interest in employing sex selection through sperm sorting.15
The first question asked was: ‘If given a choice would you like your first-
born child to be a boy or a girl?’ In Germany, 14% of respondents preferred
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their first-born child to be a boy, 10% preferred it to be a girl, and a vast
majority of 76% stated that they simply did not care about the sex of
their first-born baby. The UK survey yielded a similar result: 16% of British
men and women preferred their first-born child to be a boy, 10% a girl, and
74% said they did not care. In the USA, however, respondents had much
stronger gender preferences for their first-born child: 39% preferred a
boy, 19% preferred a girl, and only 42% did not mind the sex of their first
child.
The second question was: ‘If you were to have more than one child, would
you prefer to have only boys, only girls, more boys than girls, more girls than
boys, an equal number of boys and girls, or does the sex of your children not
matter to you?’ In Germany, 1% said they would like only boys, 1% only girls,
4% more boys than girls, 3% more girls than boys, 30% an equal number of
boys and girls, and 58% stated that they did not care. In the UK, 3% wanted
only boys, 2% only girls, 6% more boys than girls, 4% more girls than boys,
an astonishing 68% an equal number of boys and girls, and 16% did not care
about the sex of their offspring. In the USA, 5% stated they would like only
boys, 4% only girls, 7% more boys than girls, 6% more girls than boys, 50%
an equal number of boys and girls, and 27% said they did not mind their
children’s sex.
The third question inquired about the participants’ interest in using
MicroSort. In order to make an informed decision, they were told what this
technology actually implies. Thus, they were informed that they would have
to visit a fertility centre, to provide a sperm sample for flow cytometric
separation, to undergo an average of three to five cycles of intrauterine
insemination, and to pay a fee of approximately £1250 per attempt. In
Germany, 6% could imagine taking advantage of MicroSort; however, an
overwhelming majority of 92% found it simply to be out of the question. In
the USA, the response was quite similar to that in Germany: only 8% could
conceive of employing MicroSort, 18% were undecided, and 74% said they
would not want to use it. Interestingly, in the UK, 21% were responsive to the
idea of using MicroSort, 7% were undecided, and 71% said they cannot
imagine taking advantage of it.
To establish whether the 92% of Germans and the 74% of Americans who
rejected the idea of using MicroSort were in fact not interested in selecting the
sex of their offspring or simply found the procedure to be too demanding, they
were asked: ‘Suppose the technology would require just a single cycle of
artificial insemination, could be performed in any doctor’s office and would be
covered by your health insurance, would you then consider taking advantage of
it?’ Given these less demanding circumstances, 5% of Germans and 12% of
Americans were prepared to reconsider their unwillingness to use MicroSort,
while 94% of Germans and 64% of Americans still rejected the idea of using it;
1% of Germans and 24% of Americans stated they were not sure.
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Finally, we asked the participants to imagine that there was a medication to
select the sex of their children. Rather than visiting a fertility clinic, they
would simply have to take a ‘blue pill’ to ensure the birth of a boy or a ‘pink
pill’ to ensure the birth of a girl. While 8% of Germans and 18% of Americans
were willing to use such a medication, 90% of Germans and 60% of
Americans would not want to do so; 2% of Germans and 22% of Americans
were undecided. (Data from our UK survey have not yet been analysed.)
We are not sure why only 6% of Germans, 8% of Americans and 21% of
Britons are interested in sex selection through sperm sorting. However, an
additional German survey suggests a plausible answer. When we asked 1005
men and women about their moral attitudes towards sex selection and
whether or not it should be made available to all couples requesting it, 86% of
Germans were strongly opposed to it. In order to identify the concerns
underlying the widespread enmity to social sex selection, participants were
then asked about the reasons for their opposition. Eighty-seven per cent of
respondents said that ‘children are a gift and deserve to be loved for what they
are, regardless of any characteristics such as beauty, intelligence or sex’; 79%
claimed that sex selection is ‘playing God’; 76% were opposed because it was
seen as ‘unnatural’; 49% were afraid that it might skew the sex ratio; and 40%
considered it to be ‘sexist’. In light of this survey, it is safe to assume that the
lack of interest in preconception sex selection is largely due to the fact that the
overwhelming majority of Germans is strongly opposed to it.16
The same explanation might apply to the lack of interest in sex selection
observed in the UK and the USA. According to a MORI opinion poll
commissioned by the Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority, ‘69%
of Britains do not agree with the liberal proposition that any parent should
have the right to choose the sex of their child.’17 Similarly, according to a
nationwide social survey commissioned by the Genetics & Public Policy
Center at the Johns Hopkins University, ‘two thirds of Americans disapprove
of sex selection for non-medical reasons’.18
Asking the proverbial ‘man [or woman] on the Clapham omnibus’ whether
or not he would like to take advantage of MicroSort might not be the best
way to determine the actual interest in using sex selection. After all, for most
people it is a hypothetical question. Thus, we decided to survey pregnant
women before having their first ultrasound. Do pregnant women (who
usually spend some time wondering whether they are going to have a boy or a
girl) have stronger gender preferences than the general public? Are they more
interested in employing sex selection technology? And do their moral
attitudes differ from the public at large?
In Germany, pregnant women do indeed differ from the general population.
Firstly, they do have a significantly stronger preference for girls. While only
10% of the population at large wished their first-born child to be a girl, 18% of
pregnant women hoped to have a baby girl first. Secondly, and quite
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surprisingly, they are even less interested in employing sex selection technology.
Whereas 6% of the general population could imagine using MicroSort, only
3% of pregnant women could. And thirdly, their moral attitudes towards sex
selection are much more ‘liberal’. While 86% of the public at large were in
favour of outlawing sex selection, only 57% of pregnant women were in
support of a legal ban; 27% were undecided; and 16% were actually in favour of
offering sex selection to all couples requesting it.19
A US survey conducted at Cleveland State University yielded a similar
result. Of 140 women who were pregnant for their first time, 18% preferred to
have a boy, 23% preferred to have a girl, and 59% expressed no preference at
all. Asked ‘If the means were available to you so that you could have selected
the sex of your child, would you have done so?’, 18% answered with yes, 53%
with no, and 29% were undecided. Of the 26 women who said they would
have used sex selection, 13 would have done so to ensure the birth of a boy
and 13 would have done so to ensure the birth of a girl.20
Finally, a UK survey conducted at the Centre for Family Research of the
University of Cambridge produced a result akin to that of Germany and the
USA. Of 2359 pregnant women who had been asked ‘Do you mind what sex
your baby is?’, 6% preferred a boy, 6% preferred a girl, 12% quite liked a boy,
19% quite liked a girl, and 58% said they had no preference for a child of a
particular sex.21
As we know all too well, there is often a yawning gap between what people
say and what they actually do. Thus, it is reassuring that demographic
research that has focused on examining when couples stop having more
children does indeed confirm the stated preference for a so-called ‘gender
balanced family’. Couples with two boys and couples with two girls are
more likely to have a third child than couples with one boy and one girl –
suggesting that parents with children of both sexes are more content with
their family composition. This distinct trend towards a balanced family
has not only been observed in Germany, the UK and the USA, but also
in Canada, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland and the
Netherlands.22
Maybe even more instructive than social surveys are data published by
so-called ‘gender clinics’. Worldwide, there are about 75 fertility centres that
offer some method of sperm sorting followed by intrauterine insemination.
According to The London Gender Clinic, within its first 18 months it had been
consulted by only 809 couples. Of the 809 couples, 468 were of Indian origin,
259 European, 29 Chinese and the remaining 53 of other ethnic origins. The
majority of European couples were seeking sex selection to ‘balance their
family’, i.e. they already had two or three children of the same sex and wanted
to have at least one child of the opposite sex: ‘Our study shows that well over
95% of couples came for this sole purpose. They are predominantly men and
women in their mid-30s nearing the end of their reproductive life and having
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on average 2-3 children of the same sex’.23 Similarly, the Gender Clinic of
New York City reports that all of the 120 American couples seeking sex selection
were doing so for family balancing purposes: ‘They selected girls when they had
boys at home and boys when there were only girls.’24 Likewise, Gametrics
Limited in Alzada, Montana, which detailed the collective experience of 65
gender clinics says: ‘The overwhelmingmajority had two ormore children of the
same sex and desired a child of the opposite sex.25 And finally, a report of the
Genetics & IVF Institute in Fairfax, Virginia, which is currently conducting a
clinical trial on the safety and efficacy of MicroSort, states: ‘The majority of
couples (90.5%) in our study were seeking gender preselection for family
balancing purposes, were in their mid-thirties, had two or three children of the
same sex, and desired only one more child.’26
In conclusion, the widespread fear of a sex ratio distortion seems to be
unjustified. The existing empirical evidence suggests that a readily available
service for preconception sex selection will have only a negligible societal
impact and is highly unlikely to cause a severe imbalance of the sexes in
Western societies.
Although the threat of a sex ratio distortion is potentially the most
troubling problem, it is also a problem that is most easily resolved – namely
by limiting the service for sex selection to the purpose of ‘family balancing’. If
access to sex selection were restricted to parents having at least two children
of the same sex, then helping them to have a child of the opposite sex would,
if at all, only marginally alter the balance of the sexes.27
While a severe distortion of the natural sex ratio may not be a problem in
Western countries, it surely is a problem in some Asian countries such as
Pakistan, India, China and Korea. In India, thousands of girls are aborted,
abandoned, neglected or even killed right after birth. The introduction of
prenatal testing and selective abortion has apparently skewed the sex ratio of
some regions of India to such an extent that there are now only 793 girls for
every 1000 boys. According to a recent survey, ‘prenatal sex determination and
selective abortion accounts for half a million missing female births yearly.’28
Given that the practice of sex-selective abortions has been common for most of
the past two decades, it seems that about ten million female babies might have
been aborted in India alone. In February 2003, the Indian parliament took
action by amending its ‘Preconception and Prenatal Diagnostic Techniques
(Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act of 1994’. Doctors violating the Act now face
a prison sentence of up to five years or a fine of 10 000 to 50 000 Rupees.
Despite increased efforts to enforce the Act, however, the practice of sex-
selective abortions seems to be continuing.29
There are religious as well as economic reasons why Indians prefer boys
over girls. According to Hinduism, a man who has failed to sire a son cannot
achieve salvation. Only a male descendant can perform the last funeral rites to
ensure the redemption of the departed soul. More importantly, Indian
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custom is that the parents of a girl are expected to pay a dowry for her
marriage. The dowry payments are considerable. They extend from £2500 to
£75 000. To marry off one or more daughters is therefore a huge financial
burden. Since girls are a liability and boys are an asset, Indian couples have a
strong incentive for seeking sex-selective abortions. Consequently, many
medical practitioners offering ultrasound scans for sex determination have
taken advantage of the excessive dowry demands when advertizing their
services with the slogan ‘Invest 500 Rupees now, save 500 000 Rupees later!’30
Given the number of female abortions in India, it does not come as a
surprise that some authors have called for a worldwide ban on social sex
selection.31 However, does the practice of social sex selection in India really
justify prohibiting social sex selection in countries such as Germany, the UK
or the USA? The simple answer is: most certainly not! Firstly, preventing,
say, British couples from choosing the sex of their children will not change
the sex ratio of India. Secondly, even if it is only meant to ‘send a message’,
it is simply naive to assume that Indian families will appreciate our gesture,
well-meaning as it may be. As long as there are religious and economical
incentives for preferring boys over girls, our moral plea will fall on deaf ears
on the subcontinent. Thirdly, legalizing social sex selection in Great Britain
does not jeopardize our right to criticize the practice of social sex selection
in India. Approving of social sex selection through cytometric sperm
separation or pre-implantation genetic diagnosis in no way implies that we
approve of social sex selection through abortion or infanticide. Fourthly,
and most importantly, denying British couples the opportunity to have a
daughter because Indian couples have killed their girls would amount to
punishing the innocent. There is no moral justification whatsoever for
punishing the people of one country for actions committed by the people of
another.32
As we have seen, Western societies do not have to worry about an
impending imbalance of the sexes. However, even if social sex selection may
not distort the natural sex ratio, it may distort the natural birth order. Given
that a substantial portion of the US population still prefers their first child to
be a boy, it could be argued that sex selection technology may be abused
to ensure the birth of a first-born ‘son and heir’. Hence, another objection to
social sex selection claims that we are at risk of ‘creating a society of little
sisters.’ Once girls are second born, they will feel only second best.33 Is this a
sound objection? I do not think so. Although it is, quite literally, ‘conceivable’,
it is highly unlikely that hundreds of couples would employ sex selection
technology for their first child to be a boy. As already pointed out, data from
American and British ‘gender clinics’ suggest that the only couples willing to
subject themselves to an intrusive and expensive treatment for preconception
sex selection are couples who already have two or three children of the same
sex and long to have at least one child of the opposite sex. According to a study
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by Nan P. Chico who analysed 2505 letters from couples inquiring about sex
selection, ‘only 1.4 per cent of these couples were seeking a first-born son,
contrary to expectations based on an extensive review of the literature on
gender preferences.’34 Moreover, there is nothing in the literature on birth
order studies that could possibly justify the claim that children who are second
born feel second best.35
Another frequently advanced objection claims that sex selection is
‘inherently sexist’. For example, the feminist philosopher Tabitha Powledge
argues that, ‘we should not choose the sexes of our children because to do so
is one of the most stupendously sexist acts in which it is possible to engage.
It is the original sexist sin.’ Sex selection, she continues, is deeply wrong
because it makes ‘the most basic judgement about the worth of a human
being rest first and foremost on its sex.’36 However, this argument is deeply
flawed. It is simply false that all people who would like to choose the sex of
their children are motivated by the sexist belief that one sex is more valuable
than the other. As we have seen, almost all couples seeking sex selection are
simply motivated by the desire to have at least one child of each sex. If this
desire is based on any beliefs at all, it is based on the quite defensible
assumption that raising a girl is different from raising a boy, but certainly not
on the preposterous idea that one sex is ‘superior’ to the other.
A further common objection concerns the welfare of children born as a
result of sex selection. Thus, it has been argued that sex-selected children may
be expected to behave in certain gender-specific ways and risk to be resented
if they fail to do so. Although this cannot be completely ruled out, it is highly
unlikely that children conceived after MicroSort are going to suffer from
unreasonable parental expectations. Couples seeking sex selection to ensure
the birth of a daughter are well aware that they can expect a girl, not some
Angelina Jolie; and couples going for a son know perfectly well they can
expect a boy, not some Brad Pitt.
Given that social sex selection is going to be a private reproductive service
that needs to be paid out of pocket, some may worry about ‘social injustice’
arising from unequal access to technology. Hence it could be argued:
‘Allowing wealthy couples to employ yet another highly expensive medical
procedure would widen the gap between the rich and the poor beyond all
bearing. No one should be allowed to use this technology unless all members
of our society have access to it!’ I do not wish to make fun of a serious ethical
problem, but I cannot help being reminded of Woody Allen’s famous joke in
‘Annie Hall’ where two old ladies are dining in an expensive restaurant in the
Catskills: ‘The food in this place is really terrible’, says the first one. ‘Yes’,
agrees the other, ‘and such small portions!’ The point is, I gather, sufficiently
clear. If something is bad, we have no reason to complain that there is not
enough of it. A complaint only makes sense if we are talking about some
good. The same goes for sex selection. Opponents of social sex selection are
From sorting sperm to the sorting society? 31
undermining their own stance if they are criticizing the practice because it
will inadvertently lead to inequality of access. If they are concerned about
social justice they should not oppose sex selection, but promote it by claiming
coverage through their public health insurance. As to the objection that
nobody should use a new technology unless there is a guarantee that its
benefits are equally shared by all members of society, this is, once again, a
demand that ignores the economic facts of life. When first developed,
automobiles, television sets and personal computers were so expensive only a
minority could afford buying them. The only reason virtually all of us can
now afford to buy a car, a TV or a PC is that we did not interfere with the
creation of a market, stimulating competition and, consequently, lowering
the prices. Thus, if we are really concerned about poor couples being ‘left out’,
we should encourage, not discourage, couples to employ sex selection
technology. This is potentially the best way to lower its current price.
Last but not least, there is the widely popular objection that sex selection is
the first step down a road that will inevitably lead to the creation of ‘designer
babies’. Once we allow parents to choose the sex of their children, we will
soon find ourselves allowing them to choose their eye colour, their height, or
their intelligence. This slippery slope objection calls for three remarks. Firstly,
it is not an argument against sex selection per se, but only against its alleged
consequences. Secondly, and more importantly, it is based on the assumption
that we are simply incapable of preventing the alleged consequences from
happening. However, this view is utterly untenable. It is perfectly possible to
draw a legal line permitting some forms of selection and prohibiting others.
Thus, if selection for sex is morally acceptable but selection for, say,
intelligence is not, the former can be allowed and the latter not. And thirdly,
the slippery slope argument presumes that sliding down the slope is going to
have detrimental, if not devastating, social effects. However, in the case of
selecting offspring traits this is far from obvious. What is so terrifying about
the idea that some parents may be foolish enough to spend their hard-earned
money on genetic technologies just to ensure their child will be born with big
brown eyes or black curly hair? I am sorry, but I cannot see that this would
herald the end of civilization as we know it.
Since it cannot be established that preconception sex selection for non-
medical reasons would cause any harm to others, a legal ban is ethically
unjustified. However, the fact that social sex selection ought not to be
prohibited does not preclude regulating its practice. For example, it seems
entirely appropriate to limit sex selection services to licensed centres subject
to monitoring by health authorities.37 This would not only guarantee high
scientific standards and high quality professional care, but it would also
enable detailed research on possible demographic consequences and thus
allow action if, contrary to expectations, significant imbalances were to
develop.38
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